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PRIZE COURTS: THEIR CONTINUING RELEVANCE 
 




It is commonly asserted that war has been subject to some form of normative influence 
since classical times.1  Such claims have an air of wishful thinking about them when they 
are judged against the history of warfare.  Clausewitz famously stated in On War, that 
‘Attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth 
mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it’.2  His 
thinking was, of course, a product of his times and heavily influenced by his personal 
experience of wars fought on land by France under Napoleon.  He should not go 
unchallenged, however, especially in relation to war at sea.  The Emperor has never been 
noted for consulting legal advisers before resorting to war.  Nevertheless, he was 
certainly aware of the Law of Nations, often referring to it in justifying his strategic 
decisions.  One element of it with which he appears to have been very familiar was that 
relating to war at sea.   
In exile on the island of St Helena he wrote a good deal about war, including about ‘the 
law of nations governing maritime war’, of which he was especially critical.  
Unsurprisingly, he was not favourably disposed towards Britain’s use of naval power, 
claiming that the Royal Navy’s actions demonstrated that the law ‘remained in a state of 
utter barbarism’.  He had three relevant criticisms of it.  First, he objected to the 
confiscation of private property during action against enemy commerce.  Second, he 
deplored the vulnerability of civilian crews of merchant ships to capture and 
incarceration.  Finally, he disliked neutral vessels being subject to interdiction, seizure or 
destruction if carrying contraband.3  His observations were directly related to both the 
strategic purpose and the operational/tactical conduct of economic warfare at sea, that 
function of navies subject to the regulatory influence of Prize Law.  
Prize was a feature of war at sea during all of the major maritime conflicts fought during 
the era of maritime imperial rivalry, from the Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 17th century to the 
two World Wars of the 20th.  That era is now at an end.  The maritime empires have passed 
into history, as have the general and prolonged naval wars in which they frequently 
engaged.  Given the current rise in Chinese naval power and a resurgence in that of Russia, 
however, there is arguably an increasing possibility of major naval confrontation, which 
might lead to war at sea.  If it did, a return to economic warfare at sea is at least possible.  
                                                          
1    See  the essays by J Ober (‘Classical Greek Times), R Stacey (‘The Age of Chivalry’) and G Parker  (‘Early 
Modern Europe’) in M Howard, G Andreopoulos and M Shulman, The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare 
in the Western World (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 1994). 
2    C von Clausewitz, On War (edited and translated by M Howard and P Paret) (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), p.75 
3    B Colson, Napoleon On War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp.35-39. 
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It is appropriate, therefore, to assess the future relevance of Prize Law and the Prize 
Courts whose function has been to administer it.   
This demands an examination of State practice and legal thinking in the relatively recent 
past.  Nevertheless, some understanding of the historical development of Prize Law 
serves to reveal its purpose, as well as fluctuations in its application and interpretation.  
We  start, therefore, with comment about the development of Prize Law since the 17th 
century, before going on to examine its application since the end of the Second World 
War.  We will then draw some conclusions.   
 
COMMENTS ON THE HISTORY OF PRIZE LAW 
 
Despite its apparent medieval origins, Prize Law is largely a product of the Grotian Era in 
ocean affairs, which encapsulates the intense period of maritime imperial rivalry from 
the 17th to the 20th centuries.4  Throughout that era the seas were regarded as ‘free’ for 
all to use for legitimate purpose, including for the waging of naval war, which was 
regarded as a sovereign right.  Maritime imperial wars resulted in navies routinely 
interfering with their opponents’ maritime trade. The strategic aim was to apply 
sufficient economic pressure that the enemy was persuaded to capitulate.  The 
interference with, and protection of, commerce were critically important naval objectives 
between the 17th and 20th centuries.  Belligerent trade was frequently carried in neutral 
shipping and belligerents had the right to challenge and visit ships sailing under neutral 
flag, with neutral States under an obligation to permit belligerent visit and search of their 
vessels - the price they paid for the exercise of their neutral right to continue trading 
activities.  A balance evolved between neutral rights and obligations, on the one hand, and 
belligerent obligations and rights, on the other.   
The legitimate interdiction of trade was achieved in two ways.  First, enemy trade could 
be intercepted anywhere on the high seas in what came to be termed guerre de course.  
There was no geographic limit; ships (both belligerent and neutral) could be intercepted 
on any of the world’s oceans, at great distance from the confrontations on land.  A naval 
war between Britain and France, for example, could result in the naval vessels of each 
side intercepting shipping as far away from European confrontations as the Pacific and 
Indian oceans.  The second method of preventing enemy trading activity was by blockade 
operations, in which all shipping – belligerent and neutral - was prevented from accessing 
an enemy’s ports.  This was required to be non-discriminatory, with no vessels permitted 
access, regardless of flag and the nature of their cargoes.     
An important consideration for all belligerents was the risk of provoking neutrals into 
belligerency through interference with their commerce.  Prize Law evolved between the 
early-17th and mid-19th centuries to regulate the seizure of cargo embarked in both 
belligerent and neutral shipping.  Enemy goods were frequently transported under 
neutral flag and neutral goods were to be found in belligerent vessels.  In relation to 
guerre de course, the character of goods being carried was important.  A distinction was 
                                                          
4    The earliest mention in English documents dates from the 14th century; see R Marsden (Ed), Documents 
Relating to the Law and Custom of the Sea, Two Volumes (Navy Records Society, 1915) at pp.19, 44, 75, 
102 and 106..  Even earlier (in the 11th century), the Consolato del Mare was a body of law promulgated in 
the Mediterranean; see R Hill, The Prizes of War: The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars 1793-
1815 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998), p.5. 
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made between contraband on the one hand, and private and free goods on the other, the 
former being goods likely to benefit the war-fighting ability of belligerents.   
Despite Clausewitz’s dismissal of law as lacking influence, naval war came to be 
significantly influenced by Prize Law.  The complexity of the rules relating to the seizure 
of ships and cargoes demanded judicial review of any seizure, hence the establishment of 
Prize Courts.5 Those courts examined the seizure of vessels and cargoes by their own 
State’s naval vessels and by privateers operating under letters of marque issued by their 
governments.6 The legality of seizure was determined in the courts of the State whose 
naval forces were responsible for it.  The cynical may assume that a court in a belligerent 
State would reach judgment favouring its own State’s actions.  This was not invariably the 
case, however.  Prize Courts judge the legitimacy of naval actions by reference to 
international law and not by the influence of State policy. The British judicial approach, 
in particular, was generally regarded as independent of State influence.   
One issue that created some controversy was what constituted ‘international law’.  
Internationally agreed conventional law was in its infancy; there was none dealing with 
the conduct of economic warfare until 1856.7  Until then, the courts had to rely on 
customary law.  This would itself be influenced by how the State interpreted the law.  
While the courts might be independent of the State, judgments might well be influenced 
indirectly by what the State believed international law to be.  One issue of note was how 
different States defined contraband.  They each had the right to promulgate what they 
regarded as the distinction between contraband and free goods. There was no clear 
international agreement on what constituted contraband, with national Prize Courts 
applying their own State’s definition of it. 
Napoleon’s criticism of the law was a consequence of differences of opinion between 
Britain and the continental powers on the legitimacy of the seizure of private goods and 
on the extent to which neutral shipping was subject to guerre de course.  That difference 
persisted until Britain and France reached agreement on combined naval operations 
against Russia in support of Turkey in the Crimean War.  Following that war, in the Paris 
Declaration of 1856,8 the neutral flag was declared as covering enemy goods, which were 
exempt capture unless contraband, and neutral goods (again, excepting contraband) 
were exempt seizure when carried in belligerent vessels.  Even after 1856, controversy 
continued, especially in Britain where naval interests came into domestic political conflict 
with commercial interests keen to retain free movement of trade on the high seas during 
war.  Those commercial interests developed during the 19th century as a consequence of 
a shift in attitudes to do with imperial trade.   
From the 17th until the 19th century, the maritime powers with overseas empires tended 
to enforce mercantilist economic strategies which placed severe restrictions on access to 
colonies by vessels of rival powers.  Prize Law was shaped by mercantilist economic 
imperatives during that time.  As the 19th century progressed and mercantilism gave way 
                                                          
5    On the history of Prize and related subjects, an unequalled account is provided in C Colombos, The 
International Law of the Sea 6th Edition (London: Longmans, 1967) 
6  On Letters of Marque and Privateers, see R Hill, The Prizes of War: The Naval Prize System in the 
Napoleonic Wars 1793-1815 (Stroud: Sutton, 1958), pp.6-8.  Also S.B. Kaye and L.B. Bautista The Naval 
Protection of Shipping in the 21st Century: An Australian Perspective (December 15, 2011) Papers in 
Australian Maritime Affairs No. 34 p.57. 
7    In 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, in A Roberts and R Guelff, Documents on the Law 
of War 3rd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.47-52 (see below). 
8   See Note 7. 
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to free trade, however, commercial interests freed from the restraints of imperial 
economic constraints began to apply pressure on governments to restrict economic 
warfare at sea.  The emergence of economic laissez-faire coincided with the ending of the 
age of sail.  Neither was conditional on the other but their combined effects challenged 
the precepts of traditional Prize Law.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
That controversy continued to the First World War.  It affected British policy towards 
1907 Hague Convention XII,9 an attempt to establish an International Prize Court.  The 
quest for clarity on Prize Law led to the London Conference of 1909, but the agreement 
reached never entered into force.  A further attempt was made to codify the law in the 
Oxford Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare published in 191310 but, while a notable 
document, it is clearly not a formal international agreement.  When viewed through the 
methodological prism of international law, the lack of any post-1856 expanded 
conventional law and the measure of international disagreement, meant that there was 
no fully accepted ‘international Prize Law’.     
The controversy was unresolved when war broke out in 1914.  Although economic 
warfare was emphatically a major feature of war at sea between 1914-18, the principal 
means of conducting it shifted significantly due to the influence of submarines.  From 
warships interdicting merchant ships on the high seas and seizing them as prize, to 
warships attacking merchant ships without warning, either because they were steaming 
in protected convoys (which rendered them vulnerable to attack) or because merchant 
ships were armed, leading to campaigns of unrestricted attacks on trade.  The bulk of the 
merchant shipping targeted during the war at sea was sunk and never subjected to Prize 
Court process.  Submarines were the major culprit.  
In the 1930s, an attempt was made to constrain submarine operations within the same 
rules applied to surface warships.  Agreement was reached in 1930 and further 
progressed in 1936.  By the outbreak of war in 1939 almost fifty States had formally 
agreed, including all the major belligerents.11  Unfortunately, this did not result in the 
effective re-establishment of legitimate guerre de course during the Second World War.  
The German pocket-battleship Graf Spee may have conducted traditional interdiction 
operations in the South Atlantic and southern Indian Ocean in the period from September 
to December 1939 but, as the war proceeded, shipping sunk without warning far 
exceeded the amount seized as Prize.  Prize Law certainly did function during the two 
World Wars, but its overall influence was significantly less than in the age of sail.  
 
THE CURRENT BODY OF PRIZE LAW 
 
Prize Law today reflects experience since the middle of the 19th century and during the 
World Wars, with Colombos’s third edition of his Treatise on the Law of Prize appearing 
                                                          
9   1907 Hague Convention XII Relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court, available at 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/235?OpenDocument 
10   1913 Oxford Manual of Naval War reproduced in N Ronzitti (Ed), The Law of Naval Warfare: A Collection 
of Agreements and Documents with Commentaries and P Verri ‘Commentary’ (Dordrecht, Boston, London: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), at pp.277-342. 
11   By the 1936 London Protocol Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the 
Treaty of London of 22 April 1930 (see Roberts and Guelff, Documents, as Note 7, pp.170-173).  See also 
Chapter XX in this volume. 
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in 1949.12  It remains the most recent comprehensive manual on the subject.   Since then, 
there has been little change in the law governing the conduct of economic warfare at sea; 
there has been no treaty law and no general and sustained naval war to generate practice 
sufficiently significant to influence custom. 
The most obvious reference to consult today is not Colombos, however, but the San Remo 
Manual  (SRM),13 published half a century after the Second World War as an attempt to 
update the Law of Naval Warfare.14  A series of workshops involving an impressive 
number of naval officers (both operators and lawyers) and prominent academic lawyers 
from around the world were conducted to consider post-War developments.  A particular 
focus was on the Law of the Sea, including enhancements and extensions of coastal state 
jurisdiction affecting areas within which naval operation can be conducted.  It includes 
over forty rules dealing with economic warfare at sea.   
The SRM is not a source of law itself but reflects both conventional law and custom, as 
well as extensive expert opinion.  It has been used as a reference in all the main official 
State manuals dealing with the subject.15  Those manuals provide some measure of verbal 
practice, as well as an indication of what States believe constitutes opinio juris.  The SRM 
is the closest we have to a comprehensive Prize Manual today and includes an additional 
commentary in the commercially published edition.16  Very useful additional guides to 
Prize Law are Kraska’s contribution to the Max Planck Encyclopedia and Heintschel von 
Heinegg’s to The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law edited by Fleck.17  
Farrant’s recent work on neutrality is also of good value.18  In what follows, however, we 
rely exclusively on the SRM rules. 
Belligerent warships can exercise the right of visit and search in relation to any merchant 
vessels (enemy or neutral) if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting they will be 
subject to capture (SRM 118) - capture defined as ‘taking such a vessel as prize for 
adjudication’ (SRM 138). Although belligerents have this right in relation to enemy 
merchant vessels, there is no requirement for it to be exercised prior to capture (SRM 
135).  While both enemy and neutral merchant ships may be captured, in relation to the 
former there are exceptions leading to exemptions (SRM 136) and, in relation to the latter 
there are conditions that need to be met if capture is to be legitimate.  A vessel flying an 
enemy flag is assumed to be of enemy character (SRM 112), but this is also determined 
by registration, ownership, charter or other criteria (SRM 117).  A neutral flag on a vessel 
                                                          
12   C Colombos, A Treatise on the Law of Prize 3ed Edition (London: Longmans Green, 1949). 
13 L Doswald-Beck (Ed), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).  See also the Chapter by Heintschel von Heinegg in this 
volume 
14    See Heintschel von Heinegg chapter in this volume 
15    The UK’s official manual (Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004)) is a good example.  The first draft of its chapter on ‘Maritime Warfare’ consisted 
of the SRM, with subsequent drafts modified to reflect UK practice and opinion on the customary law of 
naval operations.  Eventual differences between it and the SRM are described in S Haines, ‘The United 
Kingdom’s Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict and the San Remo Manual: Maritime Rules Compared’, in 
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol.36 (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff. 2006), pp.89-118.  
16    SRM as Note 13. 
17    J Kraska, ‘Prize Law’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, available online at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1876724 ; and W Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea’, 
in D Fleck (Ed), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law 3rd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), pp.1001-1064. 
18   J Farrant, ‘Modern Maritime Neutrality Law’ in International Law Studies, (Newport, RI: US Naval War 
College, 2014), Vol.90, pp.200-307  
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is merely prima facie evidence of neutrality (SRM 113) and, if it is suspected of having 
enemy character, it can be visited and searched and, if necessary, diverted to enable an 
effective search to be conducted (SRM 114).  If it is then revealed as having enemy 
character, it may be captured as prize subject to adjudication (SRM 116).   
Enemy Vessels 
Certain enemy vessels are exempt from capture if engaged in non-trading activities 
(including hospital ships, rescue craft and medical transports; the full list is in SRM 136), 
conditional on them being innocently employed in their normal role, not committing acts 
harmful to the enemy, submitting immediately to inspection when required, and not 
intentionally hampering the movement of combatants, and obeying orders to stop or 
move out of the way when required (SRM 137).    
If an enemy merchant vessel subject to capture cannot be taken as prize at sea, it may be 
diverted to another area or to a port to complete capture, or it may be diverted away from 
its declared destination (SRM 138). Alternatively, a captured enemy merchant vessel, as 
an exceptional measure, may be destroyed, subject to criteria relating to the safety of 
crew and passengers and their personal effects, and the safeguarding of documents and 
papers relating to prize (SRM 139). The destruction of passenger vessels carrying only 
civilian passengers is prohibited, however; such vessels shall be diverted to an 
appropriate area or port in order to complete capture (SRM 140). 
Neutral Vessels  
Neutral merchant vessels are subject to capture if involved in activities rendering them 
liable to attack (SRM 67) or if it is established, following visit and search, that they are 
(SRM 146): 
• Carrying contraband,  defined as goods ultimately destined for the territory under 
enemy control and which may be susceptible for use in armed conflict (SRM 148).  
Such goods must appear on a published contraband list produced by the belligerent 
(SRM 149). Only contraband goods are subject to capture (SRM 147); other goods are 
designated as ‘free goods’ (SRM 150) 
• On a voyage especially undertaken to transport passengers embodied in the armed 
forces of the enemy 
• Operating directly under enemy control, orders, charter, employment, or direction; 
• Present irregular or fraudulent documents, lack necessary documents or destroy, 
deface, or conceal documents 
• Violating regulations established by a belligerent within the immediate area of naval 
operations; or 
• Breaching or attempting to breach a blockade. 
If a neutral merchant vessel subject to capture cannot be taken as prize at sea it may be 
destroyed, although every effort must be made to avoid doing so. It should not be 
destroyed without there being entire satisfaction that it can neither be sent into a 
belligerent port, nor diverted, nor properly released. Destruction can only be ordered if 
the safety of passengers and crew is assured, if documents relating to the captured vessel 
are safeguarded, and, if feasible, the personal effects of the passengers and crew are 
saved. It should not be destroyed simply for carrying contraband unless, by value, weight, 
volume or freight, the contraband forms more than half its cargo. Destruction will be 
subject to subsequent adjudication (SRM 151). It is prohibited to order the destruction 




Twelve SRM rules govern blockade, the aim of which is to prevent supplies reaching the 
enemy by sea.19  In the age of sail, weather permitting, blockading warships sailed close 
to the enemy’s coast and the entrances to ports. As sail gave way to steam and as weapons 
technology increased the distances over which warships could threaten each other, the 
geographical extent of blockade areas increased.  There emerged a debate over the 
relative value and legality of close and distant blockades.  
The legality of a blockade today is determined by effectiveness (SRM 95), with the force 
conducting it to be positioned at a distance which poses a reasonable risk that access to 
the blockaded coast and ports will be effectively prevented. A force positioned too close 
to the coast may be at risk from shore-based armaments but if too distant will be unable 
effectively to prevent vessels accessing blockaded ports. Positioning of blockading forces 
will be determined by military requirements against prevailing circumstances; there is 
no precise definition of the sea area directly affected by blockade from which vessels 
should be excluded (SRM 96).   A blockade should be declared to all belligerent and 
neutral states (SRM 93) and the notification should specify the extent of the blockade,  
the time it commences, its duration, and location. That declaration should stipulate the 
period following its commencement during which neutral vessels will be allowed to leave 
the blockaded coastline (SRM 94).  
A blockade does not need to be mounted by surface warships alone. Other warships can 
be employed, as can a variety of legitimate weapon systems. It cannot, however, be 
enforced by the use of weapons alone, which means that the laying of a minefield purely 
for that purpose would be unlawful (SRM 97).20 Merchant vessels believed to be 
breaching a blockade may be captured and, failing to heed warnings and attempting to 
resist capture, they may be attacked. Ordinarily the blockade must apply impartially to 
the vessels of all States (SRM 100), although the blockading power is obliged to allow 
entry and egress in certain circumstances, including for vessels in distress and those 
delivering food and essential supplies to the blockaded State’s civilian population (SRM 
103). A blockade should certainly not have as its objective the starving of the civilian 
population or damage to it in excess of the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated from it (SRM 102). Passage of medical supplies for both the civilian 
population and for the wounded and sick members of the armed forces should also be 
allowed, subject only to regulation and search as necessary (SRM 104). 
Convoying 
Convoys for defensive economic warfare can be used by both belligerents and neutrals, 
for the latter as a measure of security for their own and other neutral states’ merchant 
vessels.  Convoys of merchant vessels protected by belligerent warships are subject to 
attack without warning, regardless of the flag of the vessels in company.  To quote the 
SRM commentary, ‘Travelling under enemy convoy is held to be sufficient evidence of 
forcible resistance to the right of visit, search and capture which renders the vessel 
subject to attack without warning’.21  
                                                          
19    See the work by P Drew, The Law of Maritime Blockade: Past, Present and Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017) and also Drew’s chapter in this volume. 
20 See also the Commentary section of the SRM, p. 178. The restriction on the use of mines for this purpose 
derives from Article 2 of 1907 Hague Convention VIII. 
21    The SRM relies on Art.63 of the 1909 London Declaration as indicative of custom; see SRM, p.198. 
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Neutral merchant vessels accompanied by neutral warships benefit from exemption from 
the belligerent right of visit and search: if they are bound for a neutral port; if they are 
accompanied by neutral warships of either their own of other neutral states by way of 
agreement; if their flag state is able to warrant that they are not carrying contraband or 
otherwise acting contrary to their neutral status; and if the commanders of neutral 
escorting warships can provide all necessary information to belligerent warships that 
would otherwise be obtained via visit and search (SRM 120).  
Colombos and the SRM: A Comparison 
It is worth reflecting briefly on the extent to which the SRM is consistent with the rules in 
Colombos’s 1949 Prize Manual.  Several issues are worth highlighting, although space 
only allows for brief details.    
Character of Vessels: The SRM focuses on the flag of the vessel (SRM 112 and 113), 
reflecting Colombos.22 Reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s character can be investigated 
by visit and search. Enemy character can be determined by several factors, with the most 
common (SRM 117) being registration, ownership or charter.23 Other criteria include the 
residence of the vessel’s owner in enemy controlled territory or ownership by a 
corporation substantially controlled by enemy interests.  Colombos supports many of 
these criteria, including registration, and points out that the British Prize Court asserted 
a right to investigate beyond the flag where justified.24  It has also placed great value on 
domicile, determined primarily by time spent within a place - although establishing it can 
be problematic in the absence of any clear rule. Commercial domicile was determined by 
a person’s residence in a place for the purposes of trade and carrying on of a business.25 
According to Colombos, continental European states, as well as Japan, looked to the 
nationality of the individual, rather than residence or domicile, as well as the flag of the 
vessel.26 German practice supported the British commercial domicile theory in the First 
World War, but this was not continued in the Second World War.27 French doctrine 
considered where a corporation was founded, with French corporations, like American , 
considered national and left undisturbed except where violating national laws, such as 
trading with the enemy.28  SRM 117 Commentary considers regular domicile law a matter 
for individual states, which can utilise residence, nationality, or otherwise, as indicative.  
The international law in this area is clearly unsettled. However, the SRM supports the 
control test for corporations, arguing that broad acceptance as state practice has made it 
international law.29 It also suggests adherence to Article 51(3) of the 1913 Oxford 
Manual, indicating that States declare their intentions to adhere to either residence or 
nationality before the outbreak of hostilities.30 
Character of Cargo: The SRM does not codify the law relating to the character of cargo to 
any significant degree, instead accepting the traditional rules that the character of goods 
on enemy vessels is determined by the ownership of the goods, with those unsupported 
by proof of ownership presumed to be enemy (SRM 117 Commentary).  This is consistent 
                                                          
22 San Remo (112, 113); Colombos 79 
23 San Remo (117);  
24 Colombos 80 
25 Colombos 70, The Jonge Klassina (1804) 5 C. Rob. 297, 303. 
26 Colombos 85-91 
27 Colombos 89 
28 Colombos 86 
29 San Remo Explanation (117.1) 193. 
30 San Remo Explanation (117.1) 193 
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with Colombos,31 who deals with issues not discussed in the SRM, particularly concerning 
transactions of property. That transacted by enemies, even to neutrals, can be captured 
as prize subject to adjudication32 unless the transfer is total, representing actual delivery 
to the neutral with no reservation by the seller.33  
Restrictions on Capture of Enemy Property:  Both Colombos and SRM restrict the capture 
of vessels in neutral waters, and allow immunity from capture, usually with the caveat 
that the ship must be adhering solely to its stated mission, and not be aiding the enemy. 
SRM 137 provides rules which exempt ships only if they ‘are innocently employed in their 
normal role; do not commit acts harmful to the enemy; immediately submit to 
identification and inspection when required; and do not intentionally hamper the 
movement of combatants and obey orders to stop or move out of the way when 
required’.34 Neither work considers postal service vessels as an immune category, despite 
1907 Hague Convention XI containing such.35  This provision was ignored and overturned 
by practice.  Colombos discusses the concept of ‘days of grace’ for enemy vessels that had, 
without hostile intent, docked in port before the outbreak of war.  Internationally, 
practice was by no means general during the Second World War, and not uniformly 
enforced.  France granted seven days grace to German ships in 1941. Italy had a declared 
policy of doing the same but then failed to apply it, immediately seizing ships when war 
broke out.  The US seized foreign vessels, including those flagged in occupied states.36  
The SRM is silent on the matter. 
Contraband of War: Colombos defines two elements to contraband: that the goods are 
destined for enemy territory or control; and that the goods are capable of warlike use.37 
SRM 148 defines contraband thus: ‘goods which are ultimately destined for territory 
under the control of the enemy and which may be susceptible for use in armed conflict’. 
The definitions are broadly similar, although there are some differences in the details, 
including aspects to do with the eventual destination of goods bound initially for neutral 
ports but for likely onward transportation to enemy territory.38 Whether goods were 
capable of warlike use is partially dependent upon destination as well, but it also led to 
an earlier distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. During the Second 
World War this distinction was discarded in favour of a straightforward ban on enemy 
trade.  This was prompted by a recognition of the totality of war between 1939-45.39  This 
change has endured, with the only distinction now recognised being that between 
contraband and free goods (SRM 150).   
Navicerts: Colombos considered them ‘the most promising method’ of avoiding 
‘unnecessary friction’ between neutrals and belligerents, although noting they were used 
primarily by the UK and France but otherwise not accepted.40 Such certification is now 
                                                          
31 Colombos 81 
32 Colombos 100, [1916] 5 LI. P.C. 230, 246. 
33 The Kronprinsessan Margareta [1921] 1 A.C. 486, 499; The Vesta [1921] 1 A.C. 77, 784. 
34 San Remo (137) 
35 1907 Hague Convention XI Relative to certain Restrictions with regard to the Exercise of the Right of 
Capture in Naval War. The Hague, 18 October 1907, Chapter 1, Art. 1-2, which proposes that captured postal 
correspondence of neutrals and belligerents is inviolable and must be sent on without delay. 
36 Colombos 139-141 
37 Colombos 186-187 
38 San Remo Commentary (148) pages 215-216 
39 Colombos 214 
40 Colombos 216-217 
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referred to in SRM 122, suggesting Navicerts are now more widely recognised than 
Colombos had noted. 
Unneutral Service: Neutral merchant vessels engaged in ‘unneutral service’ are liable to 
attack. Such activities listed by Colombos include carriage of enemy military persons 
(including conscripts),41 except where travelling in a wholly private capacity;42 being 
controlled by the enemy; receiving assistance from or being convoyed by the enemy;43 
and carriage of enemy dispatches, including the reporting of enemy movements.44  
Compulsion removes neutral authority over the vessel, and so the ship would not be 
subject to punishment.45  The underlying principle is that any service given by a neutral 
ship may aid the enemy in its war. SRM 67 reflects Colombos, but the commentary to it 
provides a list of particular circumstances in which neutral vessels would be subject to 
attack. 
  
STATE PRACTICE IN RELATION TO PRIZE SINCE 1945 
 
Any developments in Prize Law would need to be based on customary law or the 
jurisprudence of any Prize Courts convened since 1945.  As there has been no general 
conflict at sea involving major maritime powers since 1945, there has been no economic 
warfare of the purpose and scale that led to the development of Prize Law.  There have 
been naval wars,  some including the use of blockade and more general interdiction of 
shipping.  Most, however, did not feature economic warfare, not even that between 
Britain and Argentina over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands.  A significant reason has been 
the short duration of most naval wars; economic warfare is most appropriate in wars of 
long duration.    
We review below those naval wars in which economic warfare methods have been 
employed.  Before we do, it is important to distinguish between naval operations in war 
and others conducted in situations short of war but which do involve the interdiction of 
shipping.  One set of circumstances, in particular, can lead to confusion.  This is when the 
backdrop is undoubtedly an armed conflict but when maritime interdiction operations 
are not conducted under the law governing naval war.  When the UN Security Council 
determines there to be  a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of 
aggression,47 it may impose sanctions: diplomatic; economic; or military.  Economic 
sanctions may be enforced by the mounting of a naval embargo operation.  Despite these 
having the appearance of a blockade authorised under Article 42 of the Charter, they are 
in fact a constabulary means of enforcing economic sanctions under Article 41.  For 
example, while there were armed conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, 
related maritime economic embargo operations in the Adriatic and Mediterranean were 
constabulary operations. Additionally, operations conducted against pirate groups or for 
other law enforcement purposes on the high seas, are not guerre de course but also of a 
constabulary nature. 
                                                          
41 Colombos 236, The Asama Maru 
42 Colombos 235, The Svithiod [1920] A.C. 718 
43 Colombos 241 
44 Colombos 232, The Edna [1921] 1 A.C. 735, 745. 
45 Colombos 245 
47 Charter of the United Nations art 39. 
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There have been around a dozen significant naval conflicts since 1945, although the 
number of naval incidents, in which the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) may have applied, 
exceeds that number (LOAC applies as soon as the naval forces of one State engage with 
those of another, but minor incidents do not invariably escalate into naval war).48  Very 
few of the naval conflicts that have occurred have relevance to this discussion; they are:             
• India/Pakistan Conflicts of 1965 and 1971: Despite both of these conflicts being 
relatively short, Prize Law was applied by both sides.49  In 1965, both Pakistan and 
India issued contraband lists and the High Court of Pakistan condemned 
approximately fifty vessels as prize.50  In 1971, both States again issued 
contraband lists and India conducted visit and search of approximately 100 
vessels.51 
• Iran/Iraq War 1980-88: Principally a land war, it did have a significant maritime 
dimension that considerably disrupted shipping in the Gulf.  During the so-called 
‘Tanker War’, Iran attempted to destroy Iraq’s ability to export oil.  Iran declared 
all goods going to or from Iraq carried in Iraqi flagged shipping as ‘contraband’.52  
Iran may have wished to effect a blockade of Iraq, but it fell short of this because 
the restrictions on neutral shipping were less constraining.  Even if they had been 
equally constrained, it would not have qualified as blockade because it would not 
have been effective given the considerable neutral naval presence deployed to the 
region to ensure the protection of shipping.53  Iran’s operations, clearly an attempt 
at economic warfare, were not conducted strictly in accordance with Prize Law. 
• Gulf Wars 1990-2003: During the 1990-91 War, coalition naval forces (over 150 
warships from 19 nations) boarded almost a thousand vessels carrying over one 
million tons of cargo contrary to UN economic sanctions.54  Notwithstanding the 
points made above about the constabulary nature of maritime embargo 
operations, action taken against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait could be 
interpreted as use of blockade under Article 42 of the UN Charter rather than the 
enforcement of economic sanctions under Article 41; it certainly had that effect. 
Coalition operations continued until the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003.   
• Arab/Israeli Conflicts:  Egypt issued a contraband list against Israel in 1950 
(modified in 1953) and convened a Prize Court using precedent from Second 
World War cases.  It only operated within its own waters and ports, although it 
continued to do so until 1979.55   Syria diverted a Greek registered vessel during 
                                                          
48    See W Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘The Difficulties of Conflict Classification: Distinguishing Incidents at Sea 
from Hostilities, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol.98, no.902 (Aug 2017). P.449. 
49   P. Norton ‘Between the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality’ in Harvard 
International Law Journal Vol. 17.2 (1976) p. 262. 
50 W. Heintschel von Heinegg ‘Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare: Part II, Developments 
since 1945’ (30 Can. Y.B. Int’l L) Volume 89 (1992) p. 96; Norton p. 262 
51 Heintschel von Heinegg, p. 99. 
52 A. De Guttry and N. Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Law of Naval warfare, edited by A 
De Guttry and N Ronzitti, (Grotius Cambridge, 1993) p.24; Heintschel von Heinegg, p. 102. 
53 De Guttry and Ronzitti, p. 24; L. E. Fielding Maritime Interception and UN Sanctions: Resolving issues in 
the Persian Gulf War, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the Haiti Crisis (Austin & Winfield, San 
Francisco, 1993) 
54 Commander J. Astley III USCG and M. N. Schmitt, USAF. ‘The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations’ in Air 
Force Law Review Volume 42 (1997) p. 27. 
55 Norton p. 258; Heintschel von Heinegg, pp. 92-93; D.P. O’Connell International Law and Contemporary 
Naval Operations (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1960) p.27 
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the Yom Kippur War in 1973.56  The most recent Prize Court activity in the region 
known to us, however, arose from the Israeli blockade of Gaza.  As far as we know, 
this resulted in the first Prize Court ever convened by Israel.57   Significantly, the 
court found against the Israeli Government and made comments about the 
contemporary relevance of Prize Law.   The case followed the 2012 seizure by 
Israel of the Finnish registered Estelle, attempting to breach the Israeli imposed 
blockade.  The Government of Israel sought condemnation of the vessel in the 
District Court of Haifa, sitting as the Admiralty Court of Israel. The application was 
based on British legislation, with jurisdiction granted historically to courts in the 
former Palestine mandate through the British Naval Prize Act 1864 and the Prize 
Act 1939.58  In its August 2014 decision59 it rejected the State’s application 
because the case had been brought before the Court after a delay of ten months 
and this it deemed excessive under customary international law.  The SRM was 
used as a reference in the case.  In one important sense, this case confirms the need 
for Prize jurisdiction in that it allowed for the State’s seizure of the vessel to be 
declared unlawful.  The Court also questioned the continuing relevance of Prize 
Law; we shall return to this below.  
    
This brief account of relevant naval wars demonstrates the paucity of actual practice.  In 
preparing this chapter, however, we also investigated the verbal practice of seven key 
States to establish whether they had legislation on Prize and official manuals providing 
guidance on the content of Prize Law.  They all do.  Those chosen were Australia, Canada, 
Germany, India, Russia, the UK and the US.60   
In Australia, the relevant legislation for the convening of a Prize Court was for many years 
the Naval Prize Act 1864 and the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890, both enacted by  
the Westminster Parliament.61 Jurisdiction under the latter act was revoked in respect of 
federal courts by the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) s 44, although the Supreme Courts of the 
States and self-governing Territories continue to enjoy that jurisdiction.62  This did not 
repeal the application of the substantive prize law in the Naval Prize Act 1864 and 
subsequent legislation in Australia, but it did remove the relevant jurisdiction of 
                                                          
56 Heintschel von Heinegg p.93 
57 See report by Ruth Levush at  http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-supreme-court-
orders-release-of-ship-captured-attempting-to-break-gaza-blockade/. 
58     See report by Ruth Levush at  http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-supreme-court-
orders-release-of-ship-captured-attempting-to-break-gaza-blockade/. 
59  See http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/14/guest-post-update-israelpalestine-revival-international-prize-
law/  
60  Given the recent rise of China as a major naval power, we would have liked to have included its practice 
but we had been unable to identify any by the time of writing. 
61 The application of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 to the High Court of Australia, and by 
inference to the Supreme Courts of the States, was confirmed in John Sharp and Sons Ltd v The Katherine 
Mackall (1924) 34 CLR 420. 
62 See, eg, Australian Capital Territory (Self Government) Act 1988 (Cth), Sch 5, pt 3 ‘Imperial Acts in Force 
in the Territory’ which provides that the following Imperial Acts relevant to prize remain in force in the 
ACT: Naval Prize Act 1864 (27&28 Vic, c 25), Naval Prize (Procedure) Act 1916 (6&7 Geo V, c 2), Prize Act 
1939 (2&3 Geo VI, c 65), Prize Courts Act 1894 (57&58 Vic, c 39), Prize Courts Act 1915 (5&6 Geo V, c 57) 
and Prize Courts (Procedure) Act 1914 (4&5 Geo V, c 13). On the situation of prize law in Australia, see: 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 48 Criminal Admiralty Jurisdiction and Prize (1990) 117-
159; Michael White, Australian Maritime Law (Federation Press, Sydney, 2000) 340-51. 
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Australian federal courts.  Prize Law is described in the official publication ADDP 06.4: 
The Law of Armed Conflict.63  
The Canada Prize Act 1970 grants jurisdiction to the Canadian Federal Court, while 
Canada’s position on Prize Law is contained in the Canadian Law of Armed Conflict 
Manual.64 
Germany relies on Prize regulation dating back to the Second World War, with current 
interpretation of Prize Law being contained in the Joint Service Law of Armed Conflict 
Manual. 65  
India relies on The Naval and Aircraft Prize Act 1971, with instructions for naval forces 
contained in Indian Maritime Doctrine.66 
Russia retains Prize jurisdiction before its courts, with internally published Guidance on 
IHL for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.67   
In the UK, The Supreme Court Act 1981 provides for the High Court to sit as a Prize Court 
and to exercise jurisdiction in relation to acts dating from 1864 to 1944.  The UK’s Manual 
of the Law of Armed Conflict details Prize Law but adds a note to the effect that it is 
regarded as unlikely that the UK will again need to convene a Prize Court68– a 
controversial statement, although not strictly incorrect as though unlikely it remains 
possible.   
In the US, there is a Code on Admiralty and Prize Cases, and it established two Prize 
Courts, in New York and California, during Operation Desert Storm.  The Department of 
Defence Law of War Manual covers Prize Law,69 as does the US Navy’s Commander’s 
Handbook.70 
 
PRIZE LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 
 
Despite the paucity of naval wars involving economic warfare at sea, significant naval 
powers retain the belief that they may occur in future and that some measure of 
preparedness is necessary, especially in the light of current naval tensions.  The extant 
law catered for general naval war in a different age.  Would it be adequate and 
appropriate for an economic warfare campaign conducted today?  What would a power 
resorting to economic warfare need to be prepared for?  Here we need to consider the 
nature of international shipping in the 21st century.   
                                                          
63 Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre 2006, Law of Armed Conflict, 1st ed, Defence Publishing Service, 
Canberra, ACT. 
64 Canada Prize Act R.S.C. 1970, c. P-24; The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, 
Office of the Judge Advocate General, 31 August 2001. 
65 Law of Armed Conflict Manual: Joint Service Regulation (ZDv) 15/2, Bundesministerium der 
Verteidigung, May 2013. 
66 The Naval and Aircraft Prize Act (India) 1971; Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009, Indian Navy, Naval 
Strategic Publication 1.1. 
67 Guidance on International Humanitarian Law for the armed forces of the Russian Federation (2001) 
68 Senior Courts Act 1981 (UK) (s 27); Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (JSP 383), Ministry of Defence, 
August 2013, especially 12.78.1 regarding future Prize Courts. 
69 Department of Defence Law of War Manual, Office of General Counsel Department of Defence, June 2015 
(updated December 2016). 
70    NWP 1-14M The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (Edition August 2017). 
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There have been profound changes to it in the past seventy years.  Over 90% of global 
trade is transported by sea.71  It has increased massively in volume since the Second 
World War.  In 1950, around half a billion tons of cargo was carried by sea; today, the 
figure is around 8 billion tons.72  The successful liner and tramp system that had 
dominated maritime shipping from the 19th century to the middle of the 20th simply and 
suddenly disappeared.  The reason was to do with high and increasing labour costs, 
coupled with new alternative mechanized means of handling cargos.73  Of particular 
significance was the introduction of the container, a simple and flexible means of 
transporting general cargo by sea, road and rail.  The containerisation of cargo first 
occurred in the mid-1950s but expanded significantly in the late-1960s and the 1970s.  
Today, container vessels, the largest with the capacity to transport over 20,000 
containers, are a striking feature of a sophisticated global supply system consisting of 
major shipping companies operating between substantial container handling ports, each 
linked to vital road and rail networks.74  The ports are automated facilities with 
computerised systems for loading and unloading containers, all of which have unique 
numbers for global tracking.  The container has become a fundamentally important factor 
in globalisation. Shipping costs have plummeted, and this has rendered cheap 
manufacturing costs (again labour driven) in regions like South and East Asia attractive 
draws for corporate interests. The unit cost of transporting goods by sea has dropped 
dramatically.75   
It is not just container ships that have grown in size; so too have those transporting bulk 
and liquid cargoes.  Globalisation as we know it today would have been impossible 
without the transformation in shipping ushered in by these developments.   
In a parallel attempt to reduce labour costs even further, there has been a post-Second 
World War trend towards the registration of ships to ‘open registries’.  Prior to the middle 
of the 20th century, merchant ships were mostly registered in the ports of the major 
maritime powers.  In recent years, however, those powers have improved domestic 
conditions of employment and applied stricter employment regulations; their labour 
costs have risen as a result.  Globalisation has not merely expanded trade but rendered it 
more competitive, with higher labour costs a bar to commercial viability.   Shipping 
companies in major maritime powers found it convenient to re-register vessels in States 
where labour was cheaper.  The previously symbiotic relationship between merchant 
fleets and naval forces is no more a feature. 76  The ten largest flags today are: Panama; 
Liberia; the Marshall Islands; Hong Kong; Singapore; Malta; Bahamas; Greece; China; and 
Cyprus.77   Only China has a navy of potentially oceanic significance.  The quest for ever 
                                                          
71    According to the UN International Maritime Organization; see https://business.un.org/en/entities/13  
72  See statistics in www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/shipping-and-world-trade/world-seaborne-
trade; and www.clarksonsresearch.wordpress.com/tag/global-seaborne-trade/ . 
73    M Stopford, Maritime Economics (3rd Edition) (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp.35-44. 
74    See ‘Maersk Container Ship Sets New Load Record: 19,038 TEU’ in The Maritime Executive (posted on 
22 August 2018) at www.maritime.executive.com . 
75    See M Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy 
Bigger (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
76  See www.mondaq.co.uk/x/461234/Marine+Shipping/Flag+State+2015+Top+10+Ship+Registers 
for data on Flag States 




lower shipping costs is also about to enter another phase, prompted by the prospect of 
unmanned autonomous shipping.78    
This evidence makes it difficult to imagine an economic warfare campaign being 
conducted using the existing body of Prize Law.  The bulk of maritime trade is carried by 
flags that are most likely to be neutral in any future naval conflict.  While Prize Law would 
arguably remain relevant, the process of establishing the presence of contraband in a 
typical neutral merchant ship at sea would demand something very different from the 
traditional visit and search routine.  Even if some effective  system of checking cargoes 
on neutrally flagged large container ships was established (perhaps through a 
sophisticated, internationally run, computer-based successor to the Navicert system), the 
taking of that ship as prize or its diversion to a ‘convenient port’ would be problematic.  
For a properly regulated economic warfare campaign to be possible today, Prize Law 
would need to be re-developed to cope with the contemporary and rapidly evolving 
shipping industry.   
Finally, it is interesting to reflect on what the Israeli Prize Court said in the case of Estelle.  
It contrasted the strong protection of private property in land warfare, with the lack of 
such protection in naval war.  It went on to consider the possibility that aspects of Prize 
Law seemed to be incompatible with developing Human Rights Law.79  It dealt with the 
importance of ‘armed conflict’ and the shift away from the traditional legal framework in 
‘war’.  It also commented on the possibility that Prize Law had fallen into desuetude.  
While the owners of the vessel argued that it had, the Court disagreed, saying that it 
remained a feature of Customary Law,  quoting the relatively recently published SRM.80  
 
CONCLUSIONS: ARE PRIZE COURTS STILL RELEVANT? 
 
There may be very understandable concerns about the content of Prize Law today, but 
this does not lead us inexorably to the conclusion that Prize Courts are no longer relevant.  
Indeed, arguably they have an important role to play in response to inadequate or 
inappropriate law; it is a judicial function to interpret the law to take account of changing 
circumstances.  It is compelling that a set of contemporary circumstances led to the 
convening of a Prize Court in Israel.   
There is little doubt for us that Prize Law needs to be substantially reviewed in the light 
of existing circumstances, however.  As this chapter was being prepared, a project is 
getting underway to review the SRM.  This will involve representatives from a large 
number of states globally.  They will include some of the world’s leading specialists on 
the Laws of Armed Conflict Applicable at Sea who will be well aware of the contemporary 
environment within which economic warfare methods would be applied.  The relevant 
rules in the SRM will certainly be on the project agenda.  It is considered most unlikely, 
                                                          
78   Rolls Royce Marine, Autonomous Ships: The Next Step,  www.rolls-royce.com/~/media/Files/R/Rolls-
Royce/documents/customers/marine/ship-intel/rr-ship-intel-aawa-8pg.pdf 
79   International Human Rights Law did not exist before the Second World War and Prize Law took no 
account of it; indeed, it only became a significant influence internationally in recent decades.  See S Moyn, 
The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2012). 





however, that those conducting the review will dismiss entirely the role of Prize Courts.  
The law needs to change but the courts, whose role is to interpret that law as it evolves, 
will most certainly retain relevance.   
